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FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND JIHADISTS: CHALLENGES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
INMACULADA MARRERO ROCHA1
I. INTRODUCTION - II. FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND JIHADISTS - III. IMPACT 
OF FOREIGN JIHADI FIGHTERS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND 
THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION  - IV. CONCLUSIONS.
ABSTRACT: Over the past three years the number of foreign fi ghters either resident in Europe or 
of European nationality fi ghting in confl icts in Syria and Iraq has increased. Most of them share 
radical Islamist religious motivations, and many States and international institutions classify them 
as terrorists or potential terrorists. In this study we aim to identify and characterize the phenomenon 
of foreign fi ghters starting from a historical perspective until reaching their impact on current 
international security relations. This work also analyses the causes why some groups of foreign 
fi ghters might pose a greater danger to national security than in earlier periods, and the reasons 
why the increase in the number of foreign fi ghters in armed confl ict generates a series of changes 
in confl ictual international relations. Finally it analyses the fundamentals of the measures proposed 
by the Security Council, the European Union and international cooperation forums to deal with 
the danger posed by foreign fi ghters of European origin, especially those proposals that impose 
sanctions as well as those that prefer to tackle the problem from a preventive and rehabilitative 
perspective of the individual.
KEYWORDS: Foreign fi gther, jihadist, international security, european security.
COMBATTANT ÉTRANGER ET DJIHADISTES: DÉFIS DE LE SÉCURITÉ 
INTERNATIONALE ET EUROPÉENNE
RÉSUMÉ: Le nombre de combattants étrangers de nationalité ou résidence européenne qui se 
sont engagés dans les confl its en Syrie et en Irak a augmenté au cours des trois dernières années. 
La grande majorité d’entre eux partagent des motivations religieuses islamistes radicales, et 
ils sont à ce titre qualifi és par plusieurs États et institutions internationales de terroristes ou de 
potentiels terroristes. Dans cette étude, nous prétendons identifi er et opérer une classifi cation 
du phénomène des combattants étrangers, à partir d’une perspective historique et en prenant en 
compte son infl uence sur les relations internationales actuelles en matière de sécurité. De même, 
nous analyserons les causes pour lesquelles certains groupes de combattants étrangers pourraient 
représenter aujourd’hui un plus grand danger pour la sécurité nationale que dans les époques 
passées, et les raisons pour lesquelles cet accroissement du nombre de combattants étrangers dans 
les confl its armés génère une série de changements dans les relations confl ictuelles internationales. 
Enfi n, nous analyserons les fondements des mesures proposées par le Conseil de Sécurité, par 
l’Union Européenne et lors de forums internationaux de coopération pour faire face au danger 
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que représentent les combattants étrangers d’origine européenne, notamment les propositions qui 
revêtent un caractère de sanction ainsi que celles qui préfèrent affronter le problème selon une 
approche préventive et de réhabilitation de l’individu.
MOT CLÉS: Combattant étranger, djihadisme, sécurité internationale, sécurité européenne.
COMBATIENTES EXTRANJEROS Y YIHADISTAS: RETOS PARA LA SEGURIDAD 
INTERNACIONAL Y EUROPEA
SUMARIO: En los últimos tres años se ha incrementado la cifra de combatientes extranjeros de 
nacionalidad o residencia europea que luchan en los confl ictos de Siria e Irak. La mayor parte 
de ellos comparten motivaciones religiosas islamistas radicales, y muchos Estados e instituciones 
internacionales los califi can de terroristas o potenciales terroristas. En este estudio pretendemos 
identifi car y tipifi car el fenómeno del combatiente extranjero partiendo de una perspectiva histórica 
hasta llegar a su incidencia en las relaciones de seguridad internacionales actuales. Igualmente 
se analizarán las causas por las que algunos grupos de combatientes extranjeros podrían suponer 
un mayor peligro para la seguridad nacional que en épocas anteriores, y las razones por las que 
el incremento del número de combatientes extranjeros en confl ictos armados genera una serie de 
cambios en las relaciones confl ictuales internacionales. Por último analizaremos los fundamentos 
de las medidas propuestas por parte del Consejo de Seguridad, la Unión Europea y foros de 
cooperación internacionales para afrontar el peligro que suponen los combatientes extranjeros de 
origen europeo, especialmente aquellas propuestas que tienen un carácter sancionador y, también, 
las que prefi eren afrontar el problema desde una perspectiva preventiva y rehabilitadora del 
individuo.
PALABRAS CLAVES: Combatiente extranjero, yihadista, seguridad internacional, seguridad 
europea.
I. INTRODUCTION
Barely a year after the outbreak of  the war in Syria, a number of  research 
centres, think tanks and cooperation forums, many with important ties with the 
European Union and its Member States, focused much of  their efforts in analysing 
the phenomenon of  “foreign fi ghters” from very different points of  view, such as: 
their origin, motivation, recruitment mechanisms and especially the consequences 
for European security of  their countries of  origin of  a new generation of  fi ghters 
of  European nationality or residence once they return from confl ict areas in which 
they have been fi ghting2. After an extensive review of  scientifi c articles, analyses 
2 Without seeking to be exhaustive, outstanding among the research centres and intergovermental 
cooperation forums  which have been intensively involved recently in this matter are: Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, The Soufan Group, Global, Counterterrorism Forum, Radicalization Awareness 
Network, International Center for Counter-Terrorism, King College, International Center for the 
Studies of  Radicalization and Political Violence, Institute for Strategy Dialogue.
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and technical reports that have been prepared on the issue in record time, we can 
draw the following preliminary conclusions: 1) most of  these analyses consider that 
foreign fi ghters may be a real threat to the safety of  their home countries, although 
there is no agreement on the nature, size and actual extent of  the danger posed; 2) 
in recent times the fi gure of  the foreign fi ghter has tended to be assimilated with 
the terrorist; 3) and the proposals made to deal with the danger posed by foreign 
fi ghters obviate the diffi culties in tackling an investigation that offers accurate data 
on the type, profi le, motivation and development of  foreign fi ghters. It also sets 
out the diffi culties in adapting to the idiosyncrasies of  each of  the Member States 
of  the European Union, above all, those think that this issue has one dimension, 
primarily of  national security.
Taking into account the review of  the latest analyses on this issue, examining 
existing doctrine on the phenomenon of  foreign fi ghters, before the wars in Syria 
and Iraq, and the study of  the treatment the Security Council and the United Nations 
Member States of  the European Union have given to this issue, in these pages we 
intend to address the phenomenon of  foreign fi ghters starting from a historical 
perspective to reach their impact on current international security relations. In a 
second section, we will identify the reasons why some groups of  foreign fi ghters 
from Europe today could pose a greater danger to national security than in the past, 
leading to a greater concern among national and international institutions. Likewise, 
we will examine the reasons why the increase in the number of  foreign fi ghters in 
armed confl icts generate a series of  changes in confl icting international relations, 
which affect the Member States of  the European Union and virtually all States of  
the international community. Finally, the work addresses the fundamentals of  the 
measures and proposals being developed by the Member States of  the European 
Union to neutralize the danger posed by foreign fi ghters of  European origin.
II. FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND JIHADISTS
Foreign fi ghters are considered to be those who join an insurgency during a 
civil confl ict in countries of  which they are not nationals3. Thomas Hegghammer 
adds that they have no previous ties to the state or the various warring factions, do 
not belong to any offi cial military organization and are not profi t-making, which 
3 MALET, D., Foreign Fighters: Transnational identity in Civil Confl icts, Oxford University Press, New York, 
2013, p. 9.
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excludes them from the defi nition of  mercenaries, although there is no evidence 
that foreign fi ghters do not receive pay as soldiers4. This defi nition excludes exiles 
and refugees from the country where the confl ict develops and who return to 
join the insurgency. In principle, the foreign fi ghter can be differentiated from the 
terrorist, who often acts in an area outside the armed confl ict and against civilians5.
However, since 2012, the fl ow of  foreign fi ghters to Syria has increased 
substantially, which has led to the inclusion of  other fi gures such as jihadi or 
terrorist in the category of  foreign fi ghters. The confusion over the term foreign 
fi ghter with terrorist and jihadist is due in large part to the stereotype that the 
media offer. A study on Italian right-wing foreign fi ghters in Ukraine by Agenfor 
Media, an Italian agency for investigative journalism, shows that radicalization is 
an ancient, global phenomenon that is not only associated with Islam6. Islamist 
narrative is only part of  a broader phenomenon, and if  we do not understand 
that reality, we can hardly know the roots of  the problem and devise effective 
policies of  de-radicalization. Therefore, we must take into account the different 
circumstances of  foreign fi ghters, which is a phenomenon linked to radicalization, 
but also appreciate that radicalization can have secular and nationalist roots and, at 
other times, the roots are religious, whether Jewish (fi ghters in the confl ict in 1948 
in Israel), Christian (as Sutoro Christian militias in Syria or the Christian group 
Dwekh Nawsha, fi ghting in Iraqi Kurdistan) or Islamist (Afghanistan, Burna /
Myanmar, Bosnia, Libya, Kashmir, Syria , etc.)7.
David Malet, a professor of  Colorado State University (USA) addressed the 
phenomenon of  foreign fi ghters from a historical and comprehensive perspective 
(The Foreign Fighter Project), concluding that foreign fi ghters are neither a new 
4 CANNY, N., “A Mercenary World: “A Legal Analysis of  the International Problem of  Mercenarism”, 
University College Dublin Law Review, Vol. 3, 2003, pp. 33-56 and LIU, H. J., “Mercenaries in Libya: 
Ramifi cations of  the Treatment of  ‘Armed Mercenary Personnel’ under the Arms Embargo for Private 
Military Company Contractors”, Journal of  Confl ict and Security Law, Vol. 16, Nº 2, 2011, pp. 393-319.
5 HEGGHAMMER, T., “The Rise of  Muslim Foreign Fighters. Islam and the Globalization of  Jihad”, 
International Security, Vol. 35, Nº 3, 2010/2011, pp. 57-58.
6 “Italian Right Wing Extremists As Foreign Fighters in Ukrania”, Foreign Fighters: A Critical Analysis, 
Annex 2, Agenfor Media, 2014, <http://www.agenformedia.com>.
7 In the fi nal Report of  the Europeo EURAD project(www.euradinfo.eu) there is a  large number 
of  interviews with non-Islamist foreign fi ghters who are now fi ghting for Christian militias Dwekh 
Nawsha on the Kurdish side. Likewise there are interviews with an interesting number of  Italian 
soldiers fi ghting in the ranks of  Ukrainian forces against pro-Russian independents (BIANCHI, S., Is 
Islamism a Threat? A New Comprehensive Model to Counter the Obscure Heart of  Radicalism, Agenfor Italia, 
EURAD Project, 2015, pp. 26-35).
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phenomenon nor exclusively Islamist8. Malet identifi ed the fi rst foreign fi ghters 
in the War of  Independence of  Greece in 1820, in which Lord Byron fought, 
through to the pan-Arab volunteers who fought against the Zionist movement in 
the 1940s to the Spanish civil war, which featured recruitment centres in Moscow 
and Paris, among others, from where between 35,000-50,000 volunteers departed 
and entered Spanish territory to fi ght alongside either the Republican forces or the 
Franco Nationalists9.
At present, large contingents of  Western fi ghters are fi ghting without religious 
motivations in the Ukrainian confl ict, both on the side of  the Ukrainian government 
forces and on the pro-Russian side; others are supporting Christian minorities in 
Syria and Iraq They are participating in the confl ict assisting Kurdish forces in 
northern Iraq, including foreign fi ghters from Shi’ite Iran, Iraq or Lebanon in 
Syria fi ghting alongside the forces of  Bashar al-Assad10. However, certain common 
aspects can be found between current foreign fi ghters and European leftists or 
liberals who fought in the Republican ranks in the Spanish civil war, such as the 
disappointment of  thousands of  young people unemployed after World War II, 
many of  them descendants of  second-generation migrants, who suffered from 
the stagnant economy, lack of  integration and opportunities11. And although 
the contingent of  foreign fi ghters in Syria is not the most numerous throughout 
history12, today it receives most of  the media, academic-scientifi c and political 
8 The Foreign Fighter Project (2007), <http://www.foreignfi ghter.com> and Foreign Fighters: Transnational 
Identity in Civil Confl icts (2009), <http://www.proquest.com/products_umi/dissertations>.
9 LEVENBERG, H., Military Preparations of  the Arab Community of  Palestine, 1945-1948, Frank Cass, 
Portland, 1993, pp. 41-43 and JOHNSTONS, V. B., Legions of  Babel: The International Brigades in the Spanish 
Civil War, Penn State University Press, University Park, 1967, p. 37.
10 Barrett calculates that the contribution of  combatants from Hezbollah to help the Assad regimen 
was between 3000-4000 individuals at the end of  2014 (BARRETT, R., Foreign Fighters in Syria, The Soufan 
Group, June 2014, p. 11).
11 In MENDELSOHN, B., “Foreign Fighters-Recent Trends”, Orbis, Spring 2011, pp. 190 -191.
12 Among the analyses published on armed confl icts with a high number of  foreign fi ghter, the 
following can be recommended: DAVIS, A., “Foreign Combatant in Afghanistan”, Janes’s Intelligence 
Review, Vol. 5, Nº 7, 1993, pp. 327-331; BRUCE, J., “Arab Veterans of  the Afghan War”, Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, Vol. 7, Nº 4, 1995, pp. 178-180; BROWN, V., “Foreign Fighters in Historical Perspective: The 
Case of  Afghanistan, in Brian Fishman (ed), Bombers, Bank Accounts and Bleedout: Al-Qaida Road In and 
Out of  Iraq, West Point, New York, Combating Terrorism Center, 2008; KOHLMANN, E. F., Al-Qaida’s 
Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network, Berg, London, 2004; SCHINDLER, J., Unholy Terror: Bosnia, 
al-Qaida, and the Rise of  Global Jihad, Sta. Paul, Minn: MBI, 2007; BATAL AL-SHISHANI, M., Rise and Fall 
of  Arab Fighters in Chechnya, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, 2006; WILLIAMS, B. G., “Al-lha’s Foot 
Soldiers: An Assessment of  the Role of  Foreign Fighters and Al-Qaida in the Chechen Insurgency”, in 
Moshe Gammer (ed.), Ethno-Nationalism, Islam, and the State of  Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder, Routledge, 
London, 2007, pp. 156-178; HEWITT, Chr. y KELLEY-MOORE, J., “Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A Cross-
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attention for several reasons13.
In the fi rst place, since the 1980s, the number of  foreign fi ghters for Islamist 
religious reasons has increased in confl icts such as Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya, 
Afghanistan, Libya and Syria, with fi gures ranging from 10,000 to 30,000 
individuals. Moreover, it is the group that has participated in the largest number of  
far-reaching, international confl icts such as Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. They have 
transnationally recruited networks, occasionally connected or led by international 
terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda or, now, Islamic State, which is what constitutes the 
major threat to current international society. However, it is a rather heterogeneous 
group so far as its ideology, support and aspirations are concerned, if  we bear in 
mind the movement from the Six-Day War to the present confl ict14.  For Michael 
Noonan, we are experiencing a third great wave of  Muslim foreign fi ghters: the fi rst 
wave is that consolidated as a result of  the invasion of  Afghanistan and the second 
is the product of  confl icts such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and confl icts in Chechnya 
or Kashmir. This third wave has a network of  seasoned fi ghters, who are based 
in countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chechnya and who, 
through the mass media offered by Al-Qaeda and others have been able to improve 
the fabric of  recruitment15.
In the second place, the most recent analyses show the war in Syria as an 
incubator of  a new generation of  foreign fi ghters, considering that about 12,000 
men and women from 81 different nationalities have moved to this area to take 
part in hostilities, of  whom it is estimated that between 2500-3000 are Western 
nationals, mostly European. Of  that amount, they calculate that at least 2,500 have 
European nationality, but the vast majority of  foreign fi ghters in Syria and Iraq are 
from neighbouring countries16. Gilles de Kerchove, coordinator of  the European 
National Analysis of  Jihadism”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 21, Nº 2, 2009, pp. 211-220.
13 HEGGHAMMER, T., “The Rise of  Muslim Foreign Fighters. Islam and the Globalization of  Jihad... 
cit.”, p. 53. 
14 PEETERS, B., Choosing Battles. A Cross-Case Analysis of  Seven Muslim Foreign Fighters Mobilization (1980-
2014), Masterthesis, Utrecht University, 2014.
15 NOONAN, M. P., The Foreign Fighters Problems, Recent Trends and Case of  Studies. Selected Essays, Foreign 
Research Institute, Philadelphia, 2011.
16 RAND, D. and VASSALO, A., “Bringing the Fight Back Home. Western Foreign Fighters in Iraq 
and Syria”, Center for New American Security, Policy Brief, August 2014 and NOONAM, M. P., “15,000-
Plus for Fighting: The Return of  The Foreign Fighters”, War on the Rocks, http.://warontherocks.
com/2014/10/15000-plus-for-fi ghting. Other equally alarming numbers are those given by the 
International Center for Counter-Terrorism of  The Hague, when it announced that the Westerners displaced 
in the Syrian confl ict 2013, between 120 and 150 were Australians (ZELIN, A. Y., ICSR Insight: Up to 
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Union anti-terrorist struggle, estimated that in 2014, around 2,000 citizens of  the 
28 states of  the European Union were fi ghting on the Syrian front, while a year 
earlier the fi gure was 50017. However, the differences in fi gures offered by the 
research institutes and think tanks generate much confusion about the accuracy of  
the data collection and the analyses developed on the basis of  these. Some of  these 
institutions are the Foreign Policy Research Institute, which estimated that between 6,000 
and 12,000 foreign fi ghters are fi ghting in the confl ict in Syria, while King’s College 
London gave the fi gure of  8500, only fi ve months before18. However these fi gures 
do not distinguish between foreign fi ghters who fi ght within moderate groups in 
the Free Syrian Army or individuals carrying out humanitarian work from those 
who have joined radical and extremist groups. In this sense James Clapper, Director 
of  USA National Intelligence pointed out that the number of  foreign fi ghters in 
Syria, in January 2014, was slightly higher than 7,000 individuals from 50 countries, 
well below that offered by other institutions for the same period19. These fi gures, 
in any event, are alarming when compared with the movement of  Muslim fi ghters 
from Afghanistan and the Soviet invasion to the various confl icts in which they 
have participated until 2001, which is estimated at some 10,00020.
It is evident that the differences in fi gures, and the extent of  the range offered 
make us wonder what data are used to make these estimates and if  they are checked 
in the fi eld because to do so would be diffi cult and risky. In addition, in cases 
in which they have been checked, the falsity of  some of  these fi gures has been 
demonstrated. As Agenfor Media points out in its research, the English Institute, 
11.000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep Rise Among Western Europeans, The International Center for the 
Studies of  Radicalization, 17 December 2013, <http://icsr.info/2013/12>).
17 Counter-Terrorism Coordinator for the European Union, Briefi ng on 29 April 2014.
18 Foreign Policy Research Institute, “Foreign Fighters in Syria and Beyond”, FPRI, Symposium and 
Webcast, 23/11/2013 and <http://icsr.info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fi ghters-syria-steep-
rise-among-western-Europeanns/>. See also the numbers given by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue in 
2014, which pointed out that between 6.000 and 1.000 foreign fi ghters go to Syria every year, of  whom 
10% were Europeans (BRIGGS, R. and FRENETT, R., “Foreign Fighters, The Challenge of  Counter-
Narratives, Policy Report, 2014, pp. 8-9). 
19 “The great majority of  foreign fi ghters appear to join extremist groups. One reason for this 
is the chronic failure of  mainstream rebel forces to fi ght effectively and work together, which has 
led to maintain their infl uence rather than build a force capable of  taking on the Syrian Army. By 
contrast, the more extreme groups, especially those with a high number of  foreign fi ghters, are better 
resourced, fi ght harder, are more disciplined, and better motivated. This give them advantages, both 
against government forces and when competing for recruits or territory with other rebel groups. A 
further reason is that extremist group are better able to absorb foreigners who may not speak Arabic 
and generally have no military training” (BARRETT, R., Foreign Fighters in Syria, op. cit., p. 10).
20 Ibid., p. 14.
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International Centre for the Studies of  Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSA), in 
April 2013 announced that eight Swiss citizens were fi ghting jihad in Syria21. In 
December of  that same year, the same ICSR corrected the data, lowering it from 
8 to 1 Swiss Islamist jihadist in Syria. Agenfor Media, in its desire to shed light 
on the veracity of  the information, went to the fi eld to locate the alleged Swiss 
Islamist, who happened to be a young Christian from Locarno, Johan Cosar, who 
had travelled to Syria to train Sutoro Christian forces, fi ghting alongside the Kurds 
against Al Qaeda and Islamic States. As a result of  this investigation, it cannot be 
said that all those who go to Syria to fi ght are jihadists and join what are considered 
criminal or terrorist organizations. Many are struggling in insurgent groups who 
even have some international legitimacy. Hence, the question that we have to ask is: 
‘Where were these fi gures obtained?’ The truth is that they were obtained from the 
Internet, and on the basis of  the statements and propaganda of  jihadi recruitment 
networks, such as the Islamic State. During the research conducted by Agenfor, 
through its EURAD project funded by the EU, it found that the interest of  
jihadist recruitment organizations is basically to infl ate the fi gures to publicize the 
success of  their cause and the enormous number of  people that they are identifi ed 
themselves as part of  the community they represent. The use of  infl ated fi gures 
contributes to associate, immediately, the idea of   foreign fi ghter with radicalization, 
extremism and terrorism, to generate moods and design specifi c policies without 
a basis of  accurate information22. The most worrying aspect of  the methodology 
21 The ICRS, in 2013, estimated that between 135-590 European foreign fi ghters travelled to Syria: 
Albania (1), Austria (1), Belgium (14-85), United Kingdom (24-134), Bulgaria (1) Denmark (3-78), 
Finland (13), France (30-92), Germany (3-40), Ireland (26), Kosovo (1), Netherlands (5-107), Spain 
(6), Sweden ( 5) and, in 2014, it estimated that at least 70 to 441 were still there. This represents 
between 7 and 10% of  foreigners who are in the area (ZELIN, AY, “ICSR Insight: European Foreign 
Fighters in Syria” http://icsr.archivestud.io/category/publications/insights, 2014) . The same year the 
same institution gave an impressive turn in the fi gures without explanation of  the methodology used 
to obtain them, but indicated that information came from government, media and social groups of  
extremists who communicated over the network. In April of  that year, the number of  Europeans 
in Syria was between 135-590 and a few months later had become of  between 396-1937, so that 
Europeans accounted for a total of  18% of  foreign Fighters in the area (ZELIN, AY, and DAVID, A, 
“ICSR Insight: Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep Rise Among Western Europeans”, loc 
cit.). According to CNN, National Government, Pew Research, in 2014, about 800 Russian citizens, 
700 French, 500 British, 300 Germans, 250 Belgians, 120 Dutch, 100 Americans, 250 Australians, 
100 Danes, 50 Norwegians, 30 Irish and 30 Swedes were fi ghting in Syria <http://yle.fi /uutiset/
cnn_fi nland_tops_list_of_countries_with_muslim_fi ghters_in_syria/7446816>. However, German 
authorities said in January 2015 that there were 600 Germans fi ghting in Syria, and have data of  378 
individuals, of  whom 89% were men and the mean age was 26.5 years (ICSR Insight: German Foreign 
Fighters in Syria and Iraq, <http://icsr.info/2015/01/icsr-insight-german-foreign-fi ghters-syria-iraq>.
22 AGENFOR MEDIA: “Foreign Fighters: Critical Analysis for Different Models of  Exit Strategies. Ideas 
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used in obtaining these fi gures is the fact that people who work for the police and 
judiciary in the European Union Member States cannot go to verify them and 
make decisions on the basis of  data that magnify the situation and do not give 
information about all the profi les and realities of  what we have defi ned as foreign 
fi ghters. In other cases, it is the data of  the police and intelligence services which 
are doubtful, providing approximate fi gures, or these of  think tanks, from people 
who have travelled or have returned to their countries. Anyway, potential European 
fi ghters enjoy greater ease of  travel to Turkey as tourists and later go to Syrian 
territory, making it diffi cult for authorities to identify individuals who wish to join 
the Islamist insurgent groups.
In the third place, the fate of  these fi ghters is diffi cult to control, especially 
because the stories that are known are very different and range from returning 
to their countries of  origin, those who decide to settle in the country where the 
confl ict takes place, forming a family, who are willing to go from confl ict to confl ict, 
wherever the Muslim community feels threatened and attacked, and fi nally, those 
who die in combat or as suicide bombers. Therefore, there is great uncertainty as 
to the vital sequence of  individuals who decide to join the insurgency, since the 
information is rarely obtained fi rsthand, and in most cases comes from the content 
appearing on social networks, which are controlled and monitored by the very 
groups that recruit the fi ghters23. In this regard, what mainly alarms the authorities 
of  European countries are the cases where their nationals fi ghting in Islamist 
groups subsequently return to their countries of  origin with what intention the 
authorities cannot know. They fear that the number of  foreign fi ghters of  western 
origin, who have greater opportunities to travel without a visa, keep coming to 
Turkey and crossing the border with Syria to join the insurgents.
In short, foreign fi ghters of  European nationality are not a new or homogeneous 
phenomenon. And it is not foreign fi ghters for ideological reasons who alert the 
police and intelligence services, nor those Europeans who during the 1980s and 
1990s with an Islamist religious motivations who fought in the Afghan war against 
Soviet invasion, nor those foreign fi ghters who joined Bosnian Muslims, or those 
who fought in Kashmir. Only those who have moved to Syria and Iraq are foreign 
for the Next Italian EU Presidency”, Agenfor Italia, Policy Paper, 2014, núm. 3, pp. 6 and 7.
23 These are the cases of  Bekkay Harrach (alias Adu Talha al-Almani) and the American Abu 
Manosur al-Amriki who are known as media stars in their countries and in others (MENDELSOHN, B., 
“Foreign Fighters-Recent Trends... cit.”, pp. 199).
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fi ghters and who have aroused the greatest fears for the safety of  European states 
and national security; issues that will be addressed in the next section of  this study.
III. IMPACT OF JIHADIST FOREIGN FIGHTERS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
AND ON THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
As shown in the previous section, Europeans with a Salafi st Islamist ideology 
fall within the category of  foreign fi ghters, who seek to move and who either 
go to or return from confl ict in Syria and Iraq, who are identifi ed as a threat to 
international security and specifi cally for European security. European fi ghters 
who are struggling in other countries and not religiously motivated, or are in Iraq 
and Syria fi ghting in defence of  Christian minorities are excluded. Therefore, the 
analysis of  the phenomenon and the proposed measures are limited to one type of  
foreign fi ghter distinguished by their nationality or place of  residence (European), 
for their motivation to fi ght in a foreign country (Salafi  Islamist, known as jihadist) 
and the geographical area to which they go to fi ght (Syria and Iraq), who seem 
to pose a danger to international and European security. These justify both the 
level of  alarm and the nature of  the steps which are being designed and taken to 
confront them, and they will be discussed in the fi nal section.
1. FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
The problems raised for European security by the group of  jihadist foreign 
fi ghters is founded on the belief  that the phenomenon transcends the activity of  
these individuals in the battlefi eld. That is, that the motivations which the individual 
had and which led to a radicalization process did not end when he was recruited, 
and were only the beginning of  a life cycle that does not end when he reaches the 
battlefi eld, but will continue, entering a spiral of  radicalization that may make him 
especially dangerous when he returns from Syria or Iraq. From there he may develop 
other activities that can further threaten European interests. First, he will become 
a recruiter of  his compatriots and thus increase the number of  foreign fi ghters in 
these confl icts by designing content or propaganda messages that reveal that the 
Muslim community in these countries is terribly threatened and needs help. Taking 
into account technological progress, a small number of  foreign fi ghters returning 
to their European countries can have a major impact through social networks in 
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their countries of  origin24. Besides, his activity will be even more effective if  he is 
able, boasting of  his experience, to highlight the most positive aspects of  joining 
other fi ghters who have been his family in the battlefi eld, thus enjoying elements of  
identity and integration which he had not enjoyed in Europe.
Second, foreign fi ghters of  European nationality or residence return with a 
knowledge of  military issues and can serve as trainers of  new fi ghters, giving oxygen 
to the vicious cycle of  radicalization. This training can even affect individuals 
who have no intention of  going to fi ght in Syria, but wish to become “internal 
combatants” and carry out terrorist attacks on European soil. This hypothesis 
is not at all far-fetched, considering the cases of  individuals of  Australian, New 
Zealand or French nationality who underwent a process of  radicalization virtually 
alone and who have attacked goods and people from their own countries, which the 
Islamic State has not hesitated to profi t from and promote25.
Thirdly, foreign fi ghters of  European nationality can become part of  the chain 
of  command of  jihadist terrorist organizations, in which Western citizens are of  
great strategic and logistical value, ready to threaten Western interests. This was 
the case of  many combat veterans of  the Afghan war against the Soviet invasion, 
whose recruitment activities had a major impact elsewhere, such as the civil war 
in Algeria, the emergence of  jihadi groups in Egypt against the regime of  Hosni 
Mubarak, the Chechen rebellion against Russia, military attacks on towns in the 
Philippines and Somalia or the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. To these we should 
add that it was the veterans of  the war in Afghanistan who created the Al-Qaeda 
organization and planned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the US, as well as 
a series of  internal confl icts26. According to Barrett, although foreign fi ghters may 
24 KLAUSEN, J. Y., “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of  Western Foreign Fighters in Syria 
and Iraq”, Studies in Confl icts and Terrorism, Vol. 38, 2015, pp. 1-22.
25 One of  these examples was the attack of  the Masked Brigade, affi liated to Al Qaeda, on 16 
January 2013, in a gas central generating station in Tigantourine (Algiers), in which the terrorists took 
800 hostages, 130 of  whom were foreigners (SINKKONEN, T., “The EU’s Toolbox for Responding to 
Terrorism Abroad”, The Finnish Institute of  International Affairs Briefi ng Paper, Nº 129, 2013). An even 
more direct blow was that perpetrated by Mohamed Merah, a young Frenchman of  Algerian origin 
who turned to Salafi sm in prison and who made two journeys to Afghanistan and Pakistan where he 
was allegedly trained by al Qaeda. In March 2012 he killed seven people, French military and Jewish 
fellow citizens (BAKKER, E., PAULUSSEN, Chr. and ENTENMANN, E., “Dealing with European Foreign 
Fighters in Syria: Governance Challenges and Legal Implications”, International Centre for Counter-
Terrorism, Research Paper, The Hague, December 2013, p. 5). See, too, some examples in the Spanish 
case in Javier JORDAN ENAMORADO, “The Evolution of  the Structure of  Jihadist Terrorism in Western 
Europe: The Case of  Spain”, Studies in Confl ict and Terrorism, Vol. 37, Nº 8, 2014, pp. 654-673.
26 MENDELSOHN, B., “Foreign Fighters-Recent Trends”, loc. cit., pp. 191 and ff.
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not return as terrorists to their respective countries, they will do so if  they have 
been exposed to an environment marked by deep radicalization and violence, and 
their behaviour therefore is unpredictable, “The grinding brutality of  the confl ict 
will lead to yet more traumatized young men becoming accustomed to violence and 
ready to carry their binary worldview back home or a new front. Not only will they 
be able and willing to commit acts of  terrorism, but they will also be in touch with 
a wide network of  fellow fi ghters to whom they are likely to feel a greater sense of  
loyalty than to any other community”27. This was the case of  Mehdi Nemmouche, 
a French citizen and author of  the attack at the Jewish Museum in Brussels on 24 
May 2014 in which four people died. He returned from Syria after fi ghting there for 
several years, marking the fi rst time that the war in Syria hit directly in the territory 
of  the European Union. Until July 2015, Nemmouche has been the only case of  
a foreign fi ghter returning and deciding to continue the jihad on European soil28.
2. FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
The recruitment of  foreign jihadi fi ghters also poses a serious problem for 
international security in general, and may modify some important aspects of  
international security relations, which will infl uence the position of  many States of  
the international community, especially Western ones.
The fi rst of  these aspects is the increased potential military power of  non-state actors, 
which now disputes the monopoly of  State forces that, so far, have kept it and used 
it to infl uence the confl icts that develop in the territory of  other States by more or 
less direct support either to the insurgency or to government institutions. Foreign 
jihadist fi ghters are presented as an alternative to professional armies, acting mainly 
in asymmetric confl icts, where one of  the parties is not a governmental actor but 
rather a guerrilla or insurgent group, using surprise attacks, sometimes suicide 
attacks with light weapons with minimal military training and combat experience.
Foreign fi ghters may also reduce the infl uence of  States that have always been 
the protagonists of  armed confl icts. Although not a new phenomenon, currently 
they have a higher prevalence in armed confl icts and in their classic actors than in 
the past, like the Cold War, when they constituted an instrument of  interference by 
the international powers in internal confl icts, therefore they were not only tolerated 
27 BARRETT, R., Foreign Fighters in Syria, op. cit., pp. 7 and ff.
28 BYMAN, D. and SHAPIRO, J., “Homeward Bound; Bosnia and Somalia”, ICCT Background Note, June 
2014 and MAHER, S., “Foreign Fighters in Syria: A Threat at Home and Abroad?”, Chatham House, p. 10. 
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but facilitated the task, as happened during the invasion of  Afghanistan, where 
foreign fi ghters became the best way to counter the progress of  the USSR, short of  
a direct confrontation between the two superpowers29. Something similar occurred 
during the Bosnian confl ict, and thanks to the incorporation of  foreign fi ghters it 
was less diffi cult to push back the Serbian occupation and achieve a map of  Bosnia-
Herzegovina in accordance with European interests30.
Second, foreign fi ghters serve as global objectives of  international terrorist groups. The 
number of  foreign fi ghters in Syria and Iraq without military knowledge and who 
are only useful as suicide bombers has grown, it could also be due to the diffi culties 
in providing training for such a large number of  volunteers. In Syria, the ratio 
of  foreign fi ghters of  European nationality and residence with groups considered 
terrorist such as Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State, all created 
by individuals from the ranks of  al-Qaeda, is more than proven. As these groups 
increase the number of  foreign fi ghters through their networks of  international 
contacts, they also increase their chances of  attacking western interests, hobbies 
and people and on western territory and could promote it among foreign fi ghters 
who return to their countries of  origin31.
In short, in confl icts with such a high number of  foreign fi ghters as in Syria and 
Iraq, a process of  privatization of  the objectives of  the confl ict is developing, widely 
infl uencing the elements of  power of  the classic actors of  the confl ict. Currently, 
we are in a period in which foreign fi ghters maintain greater independence from 
third countries and, therefore, their ability to assert private infl uence. Moreover, 
they are able to challenge government forces to derail the state model and become 
indispensable to the negotiations and other peaceful means of  dispute settlement. 
From the moment affecting the objectives of  the insurgent groups and defending 
other transnational actors, they contribute to eroding the state monopoly in 
international relations, preferring the battlefi eld where this task is much easier. 
Therefore, Paul Overby shows that the ideologolization of  Islam among foreign 
fi ghters, which was begun by Absullah Azzam, is not developing with the struggle 
for the rights of  Muslims who are in their home countries, where the institutions 
29 EMADI, H., State, revolution, and superpowers in Afghanistan. Greenwood Press, New York, 1990.
30 BLACKBURN, R., “The Break-up of  Yugoslavia and The Fate of  Bosnia”, New Left Review, 1993, 
p. 100.
31 TOPAL, O. F., “Foreign Fighters Involvement in Syria and Its Regional Impacts”, USAK Yearbook, 
Vol. 6, 2013, pp. 285-289.
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are long-established and there are mechanisms guaranteeing rights. Its struggle is 
concentrated in Islam on the periphery, where the community does not have strong 
political institutions, governments are unable to exercise their sovereign functions 
and the state can be described as failed. There, in those devastated areas is the place 
where theoretically a successful and exemplary community can be built, expelling 
the oppressors32.
Thirdly, the increase in the number of  foreign fi ghters in insurgent groups 
modifi es a certain quantitative and qualitative balance of  forces of  the parties who are fi ghting 
and which intensifi es the situation of  violence experienced by the civilian population. 
Foreign fi ghters have a different motivation, but sometimes greater and more 
intense than that of  local fi ghters, which has led them to leave their countries, 
travelling thousands of  kilometres to unknown countries to risk their lives, and 
this determines their attitude within the insurgent group and the intensity of  their 
actions. While local insurgency is normally focused on bringing about a change of  
regime or government, because of  discrimination in participation in political life, 
distribution of  wealth and violations of  fundamental rights suffered by part of  
the population for political, religious or ethnic reasons, foreign fi ghters are usually 
motivated by a desire to contribute to spreading a number of  political or religious 
ideals, identifying with the oppressed population whom the local insurgency 
represents. They have international objectives, and their actions usually respond to 
a logic with a greater reach than the local insurgency, even seeking to create an ideal 
Islamic state33. Moreover, as the duration of  the confl ict increases, the greater the 
chances that young people who are crowded in refugee camps in Syria will decide 
to join insurgent groups and serve as combatants or simply as suicide bombers, 
making the confl ict even tougher.
Finally, foreign fi ghters also contribute to the incorporation of  other private actors 
in the confl ict, from the moment that public actors are unable to meet or counteract 
the actions of  these individuals. Foreign fi ghters have their own international 
support, from States or transnational communities that fund them, provide them 
with military equipment, proper training and suitable logistics34. Increasing confl ict 
32 OVERBY, P., Holy Blood. An Inside View of  the Afghan War, Westport, Conn, Praeger Books, 1993, p. 
190.
33 DE ROY VAN ZUIJDEWIJN, J. and BAKKER, E., “Returning Western Foreign Fighters: The Case of  
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia”, ICCT Background Note, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 
The Hague, June 2014, pp. 2 and ff.
34 In this sense the Security Council requested the Group of  Experts established within the 
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areas, accompanied by greater involvement of  civilians and combatants who are 
not parties to regular armed forces have expanded the demand for conventional 
weapons, especially light weapons and small arms. Also, organized criminal 
networks have found a new client to provide weapons through their smuggling 
routes or even to act as intermediaries for private aid coming from other areas and 
provide transport and equipment for foreigner fi ghters35.
The incorporation of  foreign fi ghters in local insurgencies and the ties they 
have with transnational groups that recruited them stimulate a war economy where 
resources come mainly from abroad, as the economic and productive fabric and 
infrastructure of  the State are affected by the destruction, and it is impossible to 
carry out productive activities safely36. Especially in cases where governments fail 
to control and use their powers over the natural and economic resources of  the 
country, the reliance on external funding is even more serious37.
IV. MEASURES TO OFFSET THE SECURITY PROBLEMS GENERATED 
BY ISLAMIST FIGHTERS OF EUROPEAN NATIONALITY OR RESIDENCE
One of  the main challenges currently faced by States and international 
institutions is not only to assess the extent of  the danger posed by the increase 
of  foreign fi ghters in confl icts such as Syria or Iraq, from the moment in which 
in addition to introducing important elements modifying confl icting international 
relations, negatively affecting international security as a whole, they also pose a 
direct threat to the security of  States of  which these fi ghters are nationals. This 
Committee created by Resolution 1970 (2011) to evaluate the dangers that Libya  represents in the 
current situation in the proliferation of  arms and international terrorism and prepare a report about 
it. See MIKAIL, B., “Los múltiples restos de la reconstrucción de Libia”, Political Brief  FRIDE, Nº 72, 
2012, pp. 3 and ff. and also AMIRAH FERNÁNDEZ, H., “El fi n de Gadafi  y la difícil (pero no imposible) 
construcción de una Libia estable y próspera, ARI del Real Instituto Elcano, Nº 91, 2011, pp. 9-13. 
35 BAPAT, N.A., “State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups”, International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 50, Nº 1, 2005, pp. 231-229 and RUSSELL, J., “Non States Actors and the 2016 Proliferation 
Environment”, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, Nº 3, 2006, pp. 645-657.
36 Thomas K. DUNCAN and Christopher J. COYNE, “The Overlooked Costs of  the Permanent War 
Economy: A Market Process Approach”, The Review of  Austrian Economics, Vol. 26, Nº 4, 2013, pp. 
413-431.
37 In the case of  Iraq, it is the insurgent Group that benefi ts from the infrastructure and natural and 
energy resources; it begins to exploit and market them, so carrying out the basic functions of  the State, 
developing an alternative economic scheme to the extent of  one of  the factions of  the confl ict and its 
interests (WATKIN, K., “Targeting “Islamic State” Oil Facilities”. Int’l L. Stud. Ser. US Naval War Col., 
Vol. 90, 2014, pp. 499 and ff., and EMERY, Cr., After 13 years of  criticism, Washington now needs to work with 
Iran to prevent disaster in Iraq, LSE American Politics and Policy, 2014).
Foreign Fighters and Jihadists: Challenges for International and European Security
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 3, janvier-décembre 2015, pp. 83-10898
occurs when the process of  radicalization leads them to motivate and train future 
internal fi ghters and foreigners and fi nally, to use their knowledge to perpetrate 
terrorist attacks in their own states. To confront this, the basis of  the strategy 
has been designed by the UN Security Council and consists, fi rst, in criminalizing 
the phenomenon and encouraging States to develop border control measures, in 
addition to administrative and criminal sanctions that may stem the fl ow of  those 
who decide to travel to or return from Syria and Iraq and to deter others not to do 
so. And secondly, to encourage States to cooperate in the exchange of  information, 
data and best practices, to address a problem that transcends state borders and 
requires a process of  cooperation and coordination between the intelligence 
services and police in many States38.
In principle, fi ghting in a foreign confl ict is not prohibited by international law. 
In the context of  an international armed confl ict, international humanitarian law 
recognizes the fi gures of  combatants, civilians and others affected by the fi ghting 
(wounded, sick and prisoners of  war). Civilians and combatants have special 
protection recognized in the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949. Although 
these agreements do not specifi cally defi ne the term of  fi ghters, it does give them 
the right to participate directly in hostilities, and recognized that they cannot be 
persecuted for acts of  war committed during the fi ghting, in addition to obtaining 
the status of  prisoner of  war in case of  being captured by the enemy39. In any event, 
foreign fi ghters are subject to national law in internal armed confl ict, even though 
their actions are fully regulated in international humanitarian law40.
38 Security Council Resolution 2178(2014) of  24 September (S/RES/2178(2014), See too the 
following resolution on the matter: Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1363 (2001), 1373 (2001), 
1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1624 (2005), 1699 
(2006), 1730 (2006), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 1988 (2011), 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), 
and 2133 (2014).
39 The defi nition of  combatant, therefore, can be inferred from that of  the prisoner of  war under 
Article 4 of  the Third Geneva Convention and Article 44 of  Additional Protocol I of  1977. These 
provisions include only the regular armed forces, members of  other armed militias, members of  other 
volunteer corps and organized resistance movements provided that they all belong to one of  the parties 
to the confl ict, regardless of  nationality. Foreign fi ghters cannot be classifi ed as mercenaries under 
international law from when they do not pursue profi t when participating in hostilities (Article 47 
of  Additional Protocol No. 1 of  1977 to the Geneva Conventions, Article 1 of  the Convention UN 
against the recruitment, use, fi nancing and training of  mercenaries and Article 1 of  the Convention of  
the Organization of  African Union to eliminate the mercenaries of  1972).
40 The USA excludes foreign fi ghters from the IV Geneva Convention which forbids transferences 
of  individuals protected by International Humanitarian Law between State territorios to another 
authority (REYES PARRA, P. D., “Los Detenidos de Guantánamo en el Contexto de la “Guerra Contra 
el Terrorismo y El Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos”. Docentia et Investigatio, Vol. 10, 
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However, States and international organizations like the European Union and 
United Nations classify as terrorists individuals with a double condition: involvement 
in an internal armed confl ict while at the same time being linked to terrorist 
groups, identifi ed as such, in lists drawn up by USA and government organizations 
mentioned above. For example, the Security Council has called Islamic State and 
Jabhat al-Nusra terrorist groups and condemned their actions as terrorism, even 
though the individuals within their ranks and fi ght in the Syrian confl ict are foreign 
fi ghters and they are subject to international humanitarian law41. Given that the 
legal body that governs the conduct of  combatants in the fi eld of  either internal 
or international armed confl ict is international humanitarian law, the question we 
might ask is to what extent in the development of  combat an act can be considered 
as terrorist or criminal. In this regard, the International Commission of  Inquiry 
found that in 2006 there was an armed confl ict between Israel and Hezbollah, even 
though Israel had described Hezbollah as a terrorist organization42. This is because 
the purposes and the ideological motivation of  a group are immaterial. The parties 
to a confl ict are not required to follow a certain type of  political agenda or reasons 
to be involved in armed violence.
But international humanitarian law prohibits terrorist acts in two cases: when 
referring to attacks against civilians with the aim of  spreading terror, and when 
generally carrying out terrorist attacks against civilians not participating in the 
dispute or who have ceased to do so, without any offensive or defensive end. In 
short, although acts of  terrorism might constitute a crime, its elements are not yet 
fi xed43. Armed groups, whether or not described as terrorist groups must respect 
Nº 2, 2014, pp. 127-142).
41 Recalls that widespread or systematic attacks directed against any civilian populations because 
of  their ethnic or political background, religion or belief  may constitute a crime against humanity, 
emphasizes the need to ensure that ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and 
entities associated with Al-Qaida are held accountable for abuses of  human rights and violations of  
international humanitarian law, urges all parties to prevent such violations and abuses; 4. Demands 
that ISIL, ANF, and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida 
cease all violence and terrorist acts, and disarm and disband with immediate effect; 5. Urges all States, 
in accordance with their obligations under resolution 1373 (2001), to cooperate in efforts to fi nd 
and bring to justice individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida including 
ISIL and ANF who perpetrate, organize and sponsor terrorist acts and in this regard underlines the 
importance of  regional cooperation (Resolution 2170 (2014), 15 August 2014, S/RES/ 2170/2014, p. 
3).
42 “Report of  the Commission of  Inquiry on Lebanon, pursuant to Human Rights Council 
Resolution S-2/1, DOC. A/HRC/3/”, 23 November 2006, p. 62.
43 GASSER, H-P., “Prohibición de los actos de terrorismo en el derecho internacional humanitario”. 
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international humanitarian law, provided they are well organized and their actions, 
even those that may be described as clearly terrorist acts against civilians, are subject 
to the law governing armed confl ict, as were the actions of  the National Liberation 
Army of  Macedonia, or the Revolutionary United Front of  Sierra Leone, both 
classifi ed as terrorist groups44. However, individuals who are members of  such 
groups who have committed crimes against humanity must be prosecuted, because 
neither combatant nor prisoner of  war status grant immunity to perpetrators of  
such crimes; however, problems arise when states must obtain the evidence to 
prosecute those crimes, and in the best of  cases only some audiovisual documents 
that can be found on the network are not always evidence45.
Therefore, the application of  the rules of  international humanitarian law has 
become a very complex issue, from the moment that the identifi cation of  the 
parties to the confl ict is complicated by recruiting these fi ghters, and it is they who 
control strategies and acts of  many insurgent groups. Moreover, because of  the 
dimensions this phenomenon has acquired, and the ties of  recruitment networks 
and insurgent factions with groups that are considered international terrorists 
means that many States believe that the rules of  armed confl ict are not applicable 
to foreign fi ghters whom they simply consider as jihadist terrorists. Moreover, the 
situation became even more complex in 2014, when States want to qualify violent 
actions as terrorist acts, which develop during the fi ght, not only against civilians 
but also against other parties to the confl ict. Thus, acts of  foreign fi ghters appear 
to be in a legal limbo, which can hardly require international responsibility of  them, 
although the States want to punish these practices, which in the past have been 
allowed and encouraged, now modifying their domestic legislation to prevent the 
exit and controlling the arrival of  these combatants to their countries of  origin46.
The Security Council, like many States and the European Union, has 
automatically matched the fi gure of  foreign fi ghters with terrorists, calling them 
Revista Internacional de la Cruz Roja, 1986, Vol. 11, Nº 76, pp. 208-221 and SÁNCHEZ LEGIDO, A., Jurisdicción 
Universal Penal y Derecho Internacional. Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2004. 
44 SASSÒLI, M. and ROUILLARD, L. “La défi nition du terrorisme et le droit international humanitaire”, 
Revue Québécoise de Droit International, Hors-série (2007), pp. 31 and ff.           
45 BAKKER, E., PAULUSSEN, Chr. and ENTENMANN, E., “Dealing with European Foreign Fighters in 
Syria: Governance Challenges and Legal Implications”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 
Research Paper, The Hague, December 2013, pp. 9-14.
46 As happened in the case of  the Bill for Organic Act which modifi ed Organic Act 10/1995, 
23  November, of  the Spanish Penal Code on terrorism which punished “the displaced terrorist 
combatant” of  an internal confl ict in another State.
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Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Resolution 2178 (2014), adopted unanimously by the 
members of  the Council, and in which it condemns extremist violence and urges 
the Member States to prevent  “recruitment, organizing, transporting or equipping 
of  individuals who travel to a State other than their States of  residence or nationality 
for the purpose of  perpetration, planning of, or participation in terrorist acts”. 
To do so, the Security Council decided that all States shall ensure that their legal 
systems shall provide for the prosecution, as serious criminal offences, of  travel 
or related training for terrorism as well as the fi nancing or facilitation of  such 
activities47. The EU’s Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism proposed to 
defi ne terrorism as any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm 
to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of  such act is to intimidate a 
population, or compel a Government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act48.
From the point of  view of  international law, according to the Academy of  
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in Geneva, it is a “simplistic 
and confused” association, as there is a branch of  international law governing 
armed confl ict and another different one that handles prevention and suppression 
of  terrorism49. Either way, a global treaty banning terrorism does not exist in 
international society, due to diffi culties in reaching agreement on the defi nition of  
terrorism. There is no international treaty in force that condemns membership of  
a terrorist group or terrorist training, and certainly none of  the treaties that exist 
in the fi ght against international terrorism includes acts related to issues in the 
context of  a armed confl ict, although it is true that the resolutions adopted by the 
Security Council strive to differentiate terrorists from the warring parties, especially 
when terrorists are parties to the armed confl ict50. But the Council also decided that 
47 Resolution of  the Security Council 2178(2014) 24 September, p. 2, (S/RES/2178(2014).
48 “Islamist militancy combines a strict, literalist practice of  Islam with a revolutionary political 
ideology, proclaiming a global community of  believers (the Ummah) to be liberated and/or united 
under Islamic rule, and the belief  that the most effective way to accomplishing this aim is through 
violence or armed struggle”, in Recruitment and Mobilization for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe. 
A study carried out by King’s College London for the European Commission (Directorate General 
Justice, Freedom and Security), The International Centre for the Study of  Radicalization and Political 
Violence, 2014, p. 7.
49 “Foreign Fighters under International Law”, Academy Briefi ng, loc. cit., p. 3.
50 The States have reached agreements on certain aspects of  terrorism as shown by: the International 
Convention for the repression of  terrorist attacks committed with bombs of  15 December 1997; the 
International Convention for the repression of  Financing of  terrorismo of  9 December 1999 and the 
International Convention for the repression of   nuclear terrorismo of  13 April 2005.
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States shall prevent entry or transit through their territories of  any individual about 
whom that State had credible information of  their terrorist-related intentions, and 
require airlines to provide passenger lists for that purpose (…) outlining further 
measures for international cooperation to counter international terrorism and 
prevent the growth of  violent extremism”51. In short, the Security Council intends 
to strengthen border controls, the control of  travel documents, the development 
of  sanctions and penalties for those who attempt to travel to or return from armed 
confl ict provided that they have fought alongside groups considered terrorists or 
have perpetrated terrorist attacks.
The attacks that took place in Paris between 7 and 9 January 2015 further warned 
the European authorities of  the need to tackle this problem from a integrated 
perspective. The Member States of  the European Union have themselves accepted 
the fi gure of  the Foreign Terrorist Fighter, and have adapted their legislation and 
adopted measures to prevent a Diaspora of  European extremists who want to 
join the Syrian insurgency52. But there is no harmonization of  the laws of  the 
Member States to halt the coming and going of  foreign fi ghters. Some researchers 
like Bakker, Paulussen and Entenmann, the Global Center on Cooperative Security, 
the Human Security Colletive, or the Centre for Security Studies in Zurich have 
developed studies of  the measures the Member States of  the European Union 
have adopted. Some have decided to withdraw residence permits and citizenship 
from those individuals who had more than one nationality, even, have brought 
judicial proceedings against these individuals in some Member States, but with 
great diffi culty in obtaining evidence to prove the crimes committed in the combat 
zones53.
51 UN Security Resolution 2178(2014), 24 September 2014.
52 Article 27 (1) would justifi ably exclude foreign fi ghters from the enjoyment of  the primary and 
individual right of  the European citizen to free movement within the internal market due to the threat 
they pose for public security (Directive 2004/38). See SINKKONEN, T., War on Two Fronts. The EU 
Perspective on the Foreign Terrorist Fighters of  ISIL, The Finnish Institute of  International Affairs Briefi ng 
Paper, Nº 166, 2015.
53 After the attacks of  11 September 2001 in USA, the struggle against terrorism in the EU “moved 
rapidly to the forefront of  the EU’s policy agenda, with the result that the 28 members of  the European 
Union today are now obliged to implement a vast body of  legislation and policy. This includes a 
common legal defi nition of  terrorism and terrorism offences, and a host of  substantive criminal and 
legal defi nitions of  terrorism and terrorist offences, and a host of  substantive criminal and procedural 
laws and mechanism for cross-border police cooperation, as well as scores of  supplementary “security” 
and preventive measures. In addition, numerous EU bodies and agencies have been given a mandate 
to implement or coordinate EU-counter-terrorism policies” (Securing Europe Through Counter-Terrorism: 
Impact Legitimacy and Effectiveness, Catalogue of  EU Counter-Terrorism Measures, adopted since 11 
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But the question is to know why some foreign fi ghters when they return to 
the States of  which they are nationals or residents are able to reintegrate into 
their normal lives and others are not. All this, taking into account the cultural 
and social circumstances of  these individuals, varies depending on the country of  
the European Union where we fi nd them (in the countries of  southern Europe, 
immigration movements of  Muslim communities are more recent, while in other 
States, the third generation of  Muslim immigrants has already reached adolescence 
and, equally, the geographic origin of  these communities is different), raises several 
questions: Do they relate only to people who have had that experience or similar, 
strengthening their identity as foreign fi ghters? Are they suffering sequelae due to 
their experiences in the battlefi eld that do not allow them to get on with their lives? 
Will they take on another role in the global fi ght which could lead them to become 
recruiters, design radical content for social networks, trainers, to provide the 
infrastructure and logistics necessary for the next generation of  foreign fi ghters? 
Will they carry out terrorist acts in the territories of  their own States?
The truth is that many foreign fi ghters do not survive the confl ict, others just 
want to fi ght for a limited period of  time, others prefer to stay in the place of  confl ict 
hoping to build an ideal Islamic state and have established family ties with local 
people. Yet others continue moving from confl ict to confl ict, and only a minority 
becomes leaders of  organizations that recruit other fi ghters54. There is only one 
foreign fi ghter who has returned to European territory and perpetrated a terrorist 
attack, mentioned previously. In addition, the attacks in Toulouse, although they 
were perpetrated by individuals who had not fought in Syria or Iraq, have alarmed 
the European population with 19 million Muslims residing in their territory. 
According to Byman and Shapiro, the real danger posed by foreign fi ghters has 
been exaggerated, mixing the intentions of  this group, on their return, with those 
called internal fi ghters55. Both researchers stated in 2014 that between 10 and 20% 
September 2001, European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013), 2014); E., 
PAULUSSEN, C. and ENTENMANN, E., “Dealing with European Foreign Fighters in Syria: Governance 
Challenges and Legal Implications... cit.”, pp. 12 and ff;  “Addressing the Foreign Terrorist Fighters 
Phenomenon from a European Union Perspective”, Global Center for Collective Security, Brief  Paper, 
December 2014 and, Foreign Fighters: An Overview of  Responses in Eleven Countries, Center for Security 
Studies, Zurich, March 2014.
54 Omar Hammani,  an Americam originating in Alabama, acted as a foreign fi ghter in Somalia and 
now occupies an important leadership position in al- Shabad (ELLIOT, A., “The Jihadist Next Door”, 
New York Times Magazine, January 27, 2010).
55 BYMAN, D. and SHAPIRO, J., “Homeward Bound? Don’t Hype Threat of  Returning Jihadists”, 
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of  foreign fi ghters had no plans to return to their home countries, and only one 
in nine of  those who fought abroad, between 1990 and 2010, might return with 
the intention of  perpetrating a terrorist attack in their home countries56. According 
to the interview by Sergio Bianchi in 2013 of  Yilmaz, a Dutch foreign fi ghter in 
Syria, when asked about his intentions regarding Europe, the fi ghter replied: “I 
came to Syria for Syria only. I didn’t come to Syria to learn how to make bombs 
and to go back. We came here basically, and I know it sounds harsh, but many of  
the brothers here including myself  we came here to die, so us going back is not 
part of  our perspective here” Usama Hasan, leader of  the Salafi st movement in the 
UK, with experience in the fi rst Afganistan war and recruiter of  fi ghters for other 
confl icts responded similarly: “We were very clear in our minds that Britain was not 
a place of  Johad tant is what we grow up, went to school and university, had a job, 
we supported the local football team”57 Most foreign fi ghters never return to their 
countries of  origin and many idealize their march to the combat zone and fi ght for 
a relatively short period of  time, but may return disappointed, and after their return 
they are easily identifi ed by the authorities of  their countries. Their intentions were 
to defend the Muslim community in danger and not to attack the West. “Iraq’s 
previous war offers the most obvious example. Between 2003 and 2011, dozens 
of  Muslims from Europe and the United States traveled to Iraq to fi ght Western 
forces. Some of  them supported Al Qaeda after it established a local affi liate in 
2004 (a group known as al Qaeda in Iraq, which became the precursor to ISIS), and 
many grew more radicalized during their stay”58 Therefore, most jihadist attacks on 
European soil have been perpetrated by people whose radicalization process has 
been developed to carry out attacks against the West, with no intention of  joining 
insurgent groups in Syria59. As noted by The International Centre for the Study or 
Radicalization and Political Violence, recruitment is understood as the mechanisms 
and pathways through which an organization gets members or active sympathizers, 
Foreign Affairs, November/December 2014, p. 37.
56 “This is the case of  Mohammad Abusalha, the fi rst American to carry out a suicide bombing in 
Syria, and which illustrates this phenomenon. Originally from Florida, Abusalha joined Jabhat al-Nusra 
after travelling to Syria in late 2013, and his death stirred US Offi cials’ fears of  a terrorist attack on 
domestic soil”, Ibid., 41 and 42.
57 BIANCHI, S., Is Islamism a Threat? A New Comprehensive Model to Counter the Obscure Heart of  Radicalism, 
op. cit., pp. 29 and 30.
58 BYMAN, D. and SHAPIRO, J., “Homeward Bound? Don’t Hype Threat of  Returning Jihadists... cit.”, 
p. 40. 
59 Ibid., p. 38.
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while radicalization describes the changes in attitude that lead towards sanctioning 
and, ultimately, the involvement in the use of  violence for a political aim60.
The Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) itself, created by the European 
Commission under the EU Internal Security Strategy has questioned the usefulness 
of  excessive criminalization of  young men and women who are in confl ict zones 
when they decide whether or not to return to their countries of  origin, because 
the proposed measures are not helping to curb the phenomenon. It has begun 
to develop more preventive measures and social reintegration to complement 
the foregoing. In fact, the proposals of  the RAN, where representatives of  civil 
society participate, seek to engage foreign fi ghters or potential foreign fi ghters and 
their social environments in order to build resilience and resistance to potential 
travel to foreign confl icts61. Similarly, preventive measures and rehabilitation have 
governed the Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment 
to Terrorism on 14 May 2014, where the coordination of  police and intelligence 
services of  the Member States joins the work and collaboration with civil society62. 
According to Bianchi, “All these stories watt or raise awareness on the complexity 
of  motivations behind the phenomenon of  foreign fi ghters. It may seem cynical 
but we have to recognize that if  somebody fi ghts, dies or survives in Syria or 
somewhere else for a number of  legitimate or illegitimate reasons, this is not 
something automatically connected to our domestic security, despite all spasmodic 
headlines in the news. The Foreign Fighters exists on many latitudes but this is not 
a risk analysis. It is verifi cation. It is often enough that someone has a long beard 
and should mention religious problems in society or wants to fi ght against dictators 
or against government allied to Western powers for an analyst to automatically set 
off  a terrorism alarm in Europe. Too easy to “media base”63.
The Global Counterterrorism Forum has spoken out along the same lines 
in a meeting in which about 50 States of  the international community hosted by 
Morocco and the Netherlands, which took place in The Hague from 19 to February 
60 Recruitment and Mobilization for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe. A study carried out by King’s 
College London for the European Commission (Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security), 
The International Centre for the Study of  Radicalization and Political Violence, 2014, p. 6.
61 See The RAN Declaration of  Good Practices for Engagement with Foreign Fighters for Prevention, Outreach, 
Rehabilitation and Reintegration, 2014.
62 Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism, Brussels, 19 
May 2014, (5643/5/14).
63 BIANCHI, S., Is Islamism a Threat? A New Comprehensive Model to Counter the Obscure Heart of  Radicalism, 
op. cit., p. 34.
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20, 2014 where Heads of  States, Interpol and the United Nations shared their 
information and expertise in the fi ght against terrorism, analysing the case of  
foreign fi ghters. They discussed the danger that this group poses to radicalize other 
individuals and conveyed their military knowledge. Furthermore, they highlighted 
the need for increased border controls, particularly in transit countries such as 
Turkey; to improve communications and strategies among States to be able to draw 
up lists of  individuals that should be forbidden to enter and leave certain States64. 
But they also agreed on the development of  a comprehensive strategy, convinced 
of  the need to improve relations with the religious authorities, communities, NGOs 
and families to which potential foreign fi ghters are linked in order to prevent their 
recruitment, obtain information about their travel plans and undertake the best 
psychosocial and health interventions after their return65.
It is therefore necessary to adopt measures along the life cycle of  radicalization 
of  the foreign fi ghter of  the future, ranging from a fi rst phase in which he (or 
she) decides to join insurgent groups in the fi eld, through the phase of  military 
training and fi ghting The phase in which the return to their country of  residence 
and fi nally the decision to continue serving the groups in which they fought either 
as a recruiter or a terrorist, or as is most common, to rejoin society and, in some 
cases, collaborate in programmes of  prevention of  radicalization and recruitment66. 
Even the former head of  counter-terrorism and its intelligence services in the 
UK, MI5 and MI6, Richard Barrett, questioned the usefulness of  denying entry 
to foreign fi ghters who return to their countries of  origin, since their experience 
and testimony may be very useful to deter other potential combatants, speaking of  
the real situation on the battlefi eld, which has nothing to do with religious beliefs. 
Social reintegration can be very useful to deter potential combatants who have 
the same profi le. In his report, Barrett believes that at least one-fi fth of  British 
64 “Foreign Terrorist Fighters Initiative”, Opening Meeting of  the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, 19-
20 February 2014, The Hague.  Other document drawn up in the  Global Counter-Terrorism Forum that 
can be recommended and that serve as a reference for the treatment of  Foreign Fighters are: Rabat 
Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice 
Sector, The Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of  Violent 
Extremist Offenders and the Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach 
to the CVE; and Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as 
Tools to Counter Violent Extremism. 
65 “Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) initiative”, The Hague-Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for 
a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon, Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2014.
66 BYMAN, D. and SHAPIRO, J., “Be Afraid. Be Little Afraid: The Threat of  Terrorism from Western 
Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq”, Foreign Policy at Brookings, Policy Paper, Nº 34, 2014.
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foreign fi ghters are disappointed with what they have seen on the battlefi eld and 
only want to return to the UK. Working with these individuals is of  the utmost help 
in designing de-radicalization programmes67.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Foreign fi ghters are not a new phenomenon but have more than 200 years of  
history. Their motivations may be very different and have ideological, political or 
religious roots. Their activities in many cases have been tolerated and facilitated 
by States when their intervention in a confl ict is benefi cial to its geostrategic 
objectives. At present, foreign fi ghters of  European nationality or residence who 
are fi ghting in Syria or Iraq number around 2,500 or 3,000, a fi gure that has alarmed 
the authorities in many European states.
States and international institutions have decided to equate the European radical 
Islamist fi ghter with the terrorist and have adopted legal and administrative reforms 
that aim to prevent a European Diaspora to these confl icts. It is very diffi cult to 
know who died during the confl ict and who has the intention of  returning as veteran 
activists when fi ghters of  European nationality or residence can move with ease 
within the territory of  the Union. But as Hegghammer points out, only a minority 
of  foreign fi ghters wants to attack in their home countries when they return from 
the Syrian or Iraqi confl ict. Experience shows that it is the “domestic or internal 
combatants” without experience as combatants outside their countries, who have 
so far carried out most attacks on Western countries. However, there are few data 
on the biography of  foreign fi ghters and their intentions after returning from 
combat zones to Europe68. Faced with this alarming uncertainty, most European 
states have undertaken legal and administrative reforms to criminalize and punish 
individuals who intend to travel to or from external confl icts.
Scientifi c and academic studies must overcome the politicization and automatic 
criminalization of  foreign fi ghters, regardless of  their life cycle, supporting 
67 Saudi Arabia, the country with the greatest number of  nationals fi ghting for the Islamist State, 
calculates that of  the 3000 foreign fi ghters who have undertaken rehabilitation programmes, only 
10% have returned to violent activity (NOOR, F. A. and DORSEY, J. M., “Responding to the Islamic 
State’s Foreign Fighters: Redistribution or Rehabilitation?”, S. Rajartnan School of  International Studies 
Commentary, Nº 176, 2014, pp. 1-3).
68 HEGGHAMMER, T., “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ 
Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting”, American Political Science Review, February 2013, pp. 
1-15.
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measures for social reintegration, avoiding the assumption that any returnee means 
danger, and identifying which ones could be useful to participate in rehabilitation 
programmes that could deter other potential combatants69. The UN Security Council 
and forums such as RAN and the Global Counterterrorism Forum are increasingly 
aware of  the need to address the problem of  foreign fi ghters and jihadists from 
a multidisciplinary and holistic perspective where administrative sanctions and 
penalties are not the only measures, investing in policies to prevent radicalization 
and social reintegration, in which the participation of  deradicalized former foreign 
fi ghters, moderate Muslim communities, NGOs and families is fundamental.
69 BAKKER, E., PAULUSSEN, C. AND ENTENMANN, E., “Returning Jihadist Foreign Fighters”, Security 
and Human Rights, Nº 25, 2014, pp. 11-32.
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